Privacy × AI A weekly EU privacy and AI brief, with primary sources and practical context
Home Archive Add weekly reminder

When smart glasses make the wearer a controller

Issue 3 · 17 September 2026 · Covers 10 to 15 September 2026, plus two catch-up items from early September · About 12 min read
The weekly brief in video
1

Executive Summary

2

In Focus

AI wearables Germany / EU Supervisory report 10 September 2026

Hamburg says the smart glasses wearer becomes a controller, and a joint controller with Meta while AI training runs

On 10 September 2026 the Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (HmbBfDI) published a technical and data protection examination of the Ray-Ban Meta AI glasses, a consumer device that combines a camera, microphones, speakers and an AI assistant in an ordinary looking pair of glasses. The authority examined the first generation Wayfarer model and published the full report in German and in English. Its central conclusion is that, in the usage scenarios that matter in practice, recording identifiable people who do not belong to the wearer's close circle of family and friends will not be permissible under data protection law, other than in rare cases resting on legitimate interests.

It matters what actually reaches Meta. Ordinary photos and videos taken with the glasses stay on the device and in the phone gallery. The material at issue is what is sent when the wearer speaks to the Meta AI assistant: the image and the context that accompany the question, and the exchange itself.

The GDPR does not apply to processing carried out by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. The authority reads that exemption narrowly here. It can cover use of the glasses in a private setting where third parties are not deliberately recorded, nothing is published, and no material is passed to Meta for AI training. Since that last condition is not the default, the exemption is in practice available only to a wearer who has objected to the training use.

AI training runs by default unless the wearer objects, and while it runs the household exemption no longer applies, because the personal data of bystanders are transferred to Meta for its own purposes.

That leads to the report's most consequential finding. The wearer decides where to point the camera and what to ask the assistant, while Meta determines the infrastructure and the purposes of the training. On the authority's analysis the two act as joint controllers for that processing within the meaning of Article 26 of the GDPR. The result is that an individual consumer ends up in a role that the GDPR normally allocates to organisations.

The authority also assessed whether the device gives bystanders adequate notice that they are being recorded. Its technical testing found that the recording indicator does not. The LED is visible only from certain angles and in good light. Covering it with a sticker or paint does not stop the recording. When Meta AI is used it glows only dimly on the first generation, and on the second generation it does not light at all. The authority concludes that the mere flashing of a white LED does not sufficiently indicate that video and audio are being recorded. A wearer who wants to rely on consent or on legitimate interests would therefore have to take additional measures, such as announcing the recording or using visible signs.

On the legitimate interests test, the authority notes that recording with smart glasses will often fall outside the reasonable expectations of the data subjects, so that in the absence of transparency the balancing test will in the vast majority of cases favour the affected third parties. Face recognition is not switched on in the glasses today. The names of the database tables mentioned in the report suggest that such a feature could be added later, although that is not confirmed. If the glasses were used to identify people by their faces, that would involve processing biometric data, which is governed by Article 9 of the GDPR.

The report describes the arrangement as an opt-out: the material is generally used for AI training unless the user objects, so this is the default state rather than a deliberate choice by the wearer. On the substance of the training, the authority notes that personal data may be taken into training datasets and model parameters and that it cannot be reliably ruled out that the information continues to have an effect within the model. The report concludes that there will as a rule be no legal basis for Meta's use of that material to train its AI systems.

The procedural status matters. This is a supervisory examination report, not a formal decision, and neither a fine nor the opening of formal proceedings was announced with it.

Follow-up: the EDPB statement on smart glasses of 13 October 2026, in issue 7.

Practical impact

If an organisation issues camera-equipped smart glasses to staff, or allows them at work, it is advisable to treat the device as a recording device rather than as an accessory. Decide in advance whether the features that send material to the manufacturer may be used at all, and record that decision.

The report is describing the person wearing the glasses. It did not examine professional use in detail, but it states that professional users are always controllers and must comply with the GDPR in full. Where an employer issues the device, that responsibility will normally sit with the organisation. Check the legal basis, the information given to visitors and staff, and whether facial recognition can be switched on.

Read the English version of the report before advising. It sets out the authority's reasoning on the household exemption, joint controllership and AI training in detail, and is usable as a reference outside Germany as well.

Copies a clean, cited sentence for use in a note.
3

Key Developments

Tracking and consent EU In negotiation 10 to 11 September 2026

Should websites honour a choice made in the browser? The dispute over Article 88b of the Digital Omnibus

Today, people often have to answer a separate consent banner on every website. The proposed Article 88b of the Digital Omnibus offers another way: a person could set a tracking preference once in their browser or device. Websites and apps would have to recognise and respect the automated signal carrying that choice.

On 10 September 2026, a coalition of civil society, business and academic representatives sent an open letter to the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Its 19 signatories include noyb, BEUC and EDRi. They asked the institutions to keep Article 88b.

The coalition says the Council has removed the article from its position and that amendments to keep and strengthen it have been tabled in Parliament. These are the coalition's statements. The documents it refers to are not public.

Even if Article 88b remains in the legislation, the new rule would not take effect immediately. The Commission's proposal provides for a later start. The technical format used by browsers and devices to communicate a person's choice still needs to be defined. The precise conditions and timetable for the rule to take effect are also under negotiation.

The file continued to move in the Council during this period. The Antici Group (Simplification) was scheduled to discuss the Digital Omnibus on 11 September 2026, using a revised Presidency compromise text, ST 12535/26, and an explanatory note, WK 13065/26. The meeting notice, CM 3890/26, is public. The compromise text and note are marked LIMITE and are not public. This was a preparatory discussion. It did not mean that the Council had agreed a general approach or that talks with Parliament had begun.

This is the data and GDPR strand of the Digital Omnibus. The separate AI strand has already been adopted as Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. That regulation amended the existing AI Act and entered into force on 27 July 2026. The two legislative files should be kept distinct.

Why it mattersArticle 88b would change how a person can record a consent choice and communicate it to websites. Its adoption is still undecided. The existing consent rules remain in force either way.
Practical impactArticle 88b creates no new duty today. Organisations using a consent management platform should follow its progress through the Parliament committee stage. They can also check whether their current platform could recognise and honour a choice communicated by a browser or device.
Copies a clean, cited sentence for use in a note.
Product cybersecurity EU In force from 11 September 2026 11 September 2026

Cyber Resilience Act reporting starts, with a single EU platform

Since 11 September 2026 manufacturers of products with digital elements placed on the EU market must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents affecting the security of their products. The timetable has three steps. An early warning goes out within 24 hours of becoming aware, and a fuller notification within 72 hours. The final report is due within 14 days of a corrective measure becoming available for a vulnerability, or within one month of the 72 hour notification for a severe incident.

Notifications are submitted once, through the CRA Single Reporting Platform operated by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). They are addressed to the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) designated where the manufacturer has its main establishment, which then passes the notification to the CSIRTs of the other Member States concerned and to ENISA. ENISA launched the platform on 11 September 2026 and describes it as an initial operating capability that will be extended over the coming months.

The duty covers products already on the market, not only new products. Open-source software stewards come under the same reporting duty from 11 December 2027, which is also the date on which the substantive cybersecurity requirements of the Cyber Resilience Act apply.

Why it mattersThis is a cybersecurity duty rather than a data protection duty, but it lands on the same incidents and often on the same teams. A severe incident affecting a connected product will frequently also be a personal data breach under Article 33 of the GDPR, and both clocks may then run: 24 hours to the CSIRT and 72 hours to the supervisory authority. They are separate legal tests, so each regime's threshold has to be assessed on its own facts.
Practical impactIdentify which of the organisation's products count as products with digital elements, and add the CRA deadlines to the existing breach response procedure rather than running a separate one. Arrange access to the platform in advance instead of at the moment of an incident. Particular attention should go to who decides, and on what criteria, that a vulnerability is actively exploited.
Copies a clean, cited sentence for use in a note.
Public registers EU / Latvia Judgment 3 September 2026 Catch-up (3 Sep)

Court of Justice: unrestricted public access to shareholder data is disproportionate

On 3 September 2026 the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in Jautiva (Case C-798/24) that EU law does not require the disclosure of information on all the shareholders of a public limited company, including those holding only a small stake. The Court also assessed the Latvian regime, which provided for unrestricted public disclosure of such data, and concluded that it does not satisfy the requirement of proportionality.

The first question was whether EU company law itself compels such disclosure. The Court answered that it does not. Directive 2017/1132, which governs certain aspects of company law, does not require Member States to disclose information on all shareholders, including those holding only a small stake. That removes the argument that the national rule was simply giving effect to an EU obligation.

The Court then assessed the national regime under Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR, read in the light of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The rights to private life and to the protection of personal data are not absolute and may be limited where the limitation is provided for by law and is proportionate. It was the proportionality requirement that the Latvian regime failed.

The Court identified three features. Data of this kind reveal a person's wealth and investment behaviour. They are accessible to an unlimited group of people without any need to show a legitimate interest. And once published, their further use or dissemination can no longer be restricted.

Measured against all three stated objectives, a transparent business environment, the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, and the implementation of sanctions, blanket disclosure was found to be neither necessary nor proportionate.

The Court pointed to less prejudicial means: for the sanctions objective, general disclosure could be restricted to data on people who are on sanctions lists, while access to other shareholders' data could be limited to those who demonstrate a legitimate interest.

The judgment continues the line that began on 22 November 2022 in Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, WM and Sovim SA. There the Court declared invalid the provision of the anti-money-laundering directive under which Member States had to ensure that information on beneficial ownership was accessible in all cases to any member of the general public. The same logic runs through both cases: public corporate transparency is a legitimate aim, but it does not by itself justify unrestricted public access to personal data.

Why it mattersThe judgment strengthens the line that ties access to personal data in company registers to a legitimate interest. Two details carry the weight. First, the Court said at the level of company law that EU law does not require this disclosure, which takes away the argument that a Member State is merely giving effect to an EU obligation. Second, what proved decisive was not publication as such, but that access was open to everyone without any need to show a legitimate interest. The same reasoning is relevant where a national regime makes materially similar data available on comparable terms, including registers of beneficial owners and of shareholders. It does not by itself invalidate every register that contains company-related personal data, so the national legislation and the precise category of register still have to be checked.
Practical impactOrganisations that collect or reuse data from public company registers, for example for customer due diligence, sanctions screening or counterparty checks, should establish whether their source rests on a national regime that may change after this judgment. Keeping a register of data sources, with the legal basis noted for each, is advisable. It is also worth assessing what happens if one of those registers restricts public access: whether an alternative route based on a demonstrated legitimate interest remains available, and whether it is sufficient to keep the process running. Organisations that operate or supply registers in Member States should check whether a mechanism for testing legitimate interest exists at all.
Copies a clean, cited sentence for use in a note.
4

Enforcement Watch

CNIL · FranceEXTIADeliberation SAN-2026-010, 21 July 2026, made public 9 September

CNIL fines EXTIA 300 000 EUR over unanswered erasure requests

The French data protection authority, the CNIL, imposed a fine of 300 000 EUR on EXTIA, a company providing recruitment services in the IT and engineering sector. It found breaches of Article 12 of the GDPR, on transparency and on facilitating the exercise of data subject rights, and of Article 17, on the right to erasure.

The case began with complaints from former employees and candidates in 2024. An inspection in April 2025 found that, of 265 erasure requests received during 2024, more than three quarters had not been dealt with or had not been dealt with satisfactorily. Twelve requests were never processed at all, 166 people were never told the outcome, and 26 replies went out only after the one month deadline had passed, 204 mishandled requests in all.

During the proceedings the company argued that candidate data were deleted automatically, so that a separate notification was unnecessary. The CNIL's restricted committee rejected that argument and held that automatic deletion did not relieve the company of the duty to inform those candidates of the action taken on their requests. Under Article 12(3) of the GDPR the controller must inform the data subject of the action taken within one month, including where the request has already been carried out.

In setting the amount, the committee took into account that the CNIL had reminded the company of the relevant obligations on two earlier occasions. The company's later compliance measures did not release it from responsibility for the past breaches, and the committee saw no need to issue an injunction. The committee also accepted as justified the individual cases in which the person making the request could not be identified.

The decision was made public and the full text is available on Legifrance.

Practical pointIt is worth checking what the organisation does after an erasure request has been carried out. An automated deletion process that sends nothing back to the requester creates the breach by itself. Particular attention should go to recruitment candidate data, where requests arrive in volume and the reply is the step most easily left out of the process.
On the datesThe decision itself is not new, and it became public shortly before this issue. The deliberation is dated 21 July 2026, the CNIL published it on 9 September 2026, and it appeared on the EDPB news feed on 11 September. It is carried in this issue because of the publication date.
CNIL, sanction for failure to respect the rights of individuals, EXTIA ↗
Copies a clean, cited sentence for use in a note.
UODO · PolandPKO BP, BIKJudgment, 2 September 2026, reported 15 September

Polish Supreme Administrative Court upholds the regulator on the data of the self-employed

On 15 September 2026 the Polish supervisory authority, UODO, reported the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) of 2 September 2026 in case III OSK 252/24. The court dismissed the cassation appeals of the bank PKO BP and of the credit information bureau BIK and upheld the position of the President of UODO.

The dispute concerned the scope of Article 105a(2) and (3) of the Banking Law. The banking sector argued that those provisions apply only to consumers. The court rejected that reading and held that they also cover natural persons carrying on a business activity.

On the interpretation upheld, after an obligation has expired a bank may process the data of such a person with that person's consent, or without consent where the person was in default for more than 60 days and was given 30 days' notice beforehand.

The case turns on national banking law rather than on the text of the GDPR. It is worth noting all the same, because it shows how the retention of credit data is resolved where the relevant rule is set by national law.

UODO, the authority's account of the Supreme Administrative Court judgment in case III OSK 252/24 (in Polish) ↗
Copies a clean, cited sentence for use in a note.

Each story links to its supporting sources. Editorial analysis is clearly marked separately from factual reporting.

Sources and references

How the brief is prepared and checked

This newsletter is prepared with the help of AI and goes through several stages of review. Please check the original source before relying on the information presented here.